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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most salient economic developments of the last decade has 
been the transformation of the telecommunications industry.  Competition 
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Chris Guthrie, Todd Henderson, Lou Kaplow, Vik Khanna, Jeff MacKie-Mason, Richard Nagareda, 
Randy Picker, Bob Rasmussen, Sang-Seung Yi, Kiho Yoon and participants in a workshop conducted at 
the 15th Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, the University of Michigan 
Law School Workshop on Cyberlaw and Economics, and the Seoul National University Center for Law 
and Technology for comments on earlier drafts of this Essay.  We plan to offer a more extended and 
formal treatment of this subject in a book entitled Networks in Telecommunications:  Economics and 
Law, which is forthcoming on Cambridge University Press. 
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among conventional telephone technologies has steadily increased, as tech-
nological improvements have caused the fixed costs associated with many 
of the functions performed by conventional telephone providers to decrease 
sharply.1  At the same time, existing network technologies have faced in-
creasing competitive pressure from new transmission media.  By the end of 
2004, cellular telephones and more advanced wireless technologies, such as 
personal communications services (“PCS”), finally surpassed conventional 
wireline telephony as the leading platform for providing voice communica-
tions.2  Cable modem systems, digital subscriber lines (“DSL”), and satellite 
broadband systems have also emerged as important means of communica-
tions, with a host of other broadband technologies waiting in the wings.3  In 
addition, the shift toward packet-switched technologies made possible by 
the digital revolution has made different transmission technologies increas-
ingly interchangeable.  The impending arrival of Internet telephony, often 
called voice over Internet protocol (“VoIP”), represents the most prominent 
illustration of this phenomenon.  Together these changes have rendered a 
sector that has long been dominated by regulated monopolies more com-
petitive than ever before.4 
This fundamental transformation in industry structure has been accom-
panied by a parallel (if somewhat incomplete) transformation in the way 
that communications networks are regulated.  Long regarded by regulators 
as natural monopolies, telecommunications networks have been governed 
traditionally by a system of rate regulation that required network owners to 
provide service to all interested customers on nondiscriminatory and rea-
sonable terms.  Because rate regulation was targeted at the output of the en-
 
1  For example, the development of microwave relay systems during the 1960s lowered fixed costs 
in long-distance telephone service to the point where competition became feasible.  See Glen O. Robin-
son, The Titanic Remembered:  AT&T and the Changing World of Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON 
REG. 517, 522–26 (1988) (reviewing GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: 
TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987)).  Similarly, the reduction in switching costs made possible 
by the dramatic improvements in computer processing capability has made local telephone service in-
creasingly competitive.  See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 568–71, 586–87 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004). 
2  See FCC INDUSTRY ANALYSIS TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, LOCAL 
TELEPHONE COMPETITION:  STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004, at 1, 3, 5 tbl.1, 17 tbl.13 (July 2005) 
(reporting 178 million wireline and 181 million wireless subscribers as of the end of 2004), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom0705.pdf; Implemen-
tation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993:  Annual Report and 
Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Eighth Re-
port, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,783, 14,831–34 ¶¶ 101–106 (2003) [hereinafter Eighth Report on CMRS Competi-
tion] (detailing the increase in wireless-wireline competition). 
3  These include advanced mobile telephone technologies called third-generation wireless (“3G”) 
that are capable of delivering Internet service, broadband provided via electric power lines, the wides-
cale deployment of fiber optic cable to homes and businesses, and innovative unlicensed spectrum-based 
technologies such as ultra wideband and WiFi mesh networks. 
4  See generally Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 
(1995).   
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tire network, regulatory authorities did not need an overarching theory of 
how networks are configured or how individual network components inter-
act with one another.  They only needed to ensure that the total revenues 
were sufficient to cover the total network cost. 
The emergence of competition has forced regulatory authorities to 
abandon their traditional reliance on rate regulation in favor of a new ap-
proach known as access regulation.  Unlike rate regulation, which focuses 
on the terms under which network owners sell outputs to consumers, access 
regulation instead focuses on the terms under which network owners must 
lease key inputs to competitors.  The leading example of access regulation 
is the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires certain local tele-
phone companies to provide competitors with access to key elements of 
their networks.5  Access regulation has also emerged as a dominant feature 
in the regulation of a wide range of other network facilities, including cable 
television systems, broadband technologies, networks of utility poles, natu-
ral gas pipelines, and electric power distribution grids.6 
The shift from rate regulation to access regulation has fundamentally 
altered the primary unit of regulatory analysis.  Rather than setting prices 
charged for the services of the entire network, regulators must now deter-
mine the prices charged for individual network components.  In the process, 
this shift has created the need for a better understanding of the interrelation-
ships among network elements.  Unfortunately, rather than developing more 
sophisticated theories of network behavior, regulatory authorities have im-
plemented access regimes by continuing to focus on the cost of each net-
work component.7  This has had the effect of ignoring the interactions 
among network components and, instead, treats each element as if it existed 
in a vacuum. 
 
5  47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2004).  The statute requires that the accessed elements be “necessary” and that 
“the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunica-
tions carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer.”  Id. § 251(d)(2)(A) & (B).  For 
a review of the regulatory antecedents to § 251(c)(3), see Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Ac-
cess to Networks:  Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 960–65, 1005–
09 (2003). 
6  See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340–46 (1998) (calling the shift toward unbundling requirements part 
of the “great transformation of regulated industries law” and tracing the emergence of access regulation 
in the telephone and natural gas industries); Spulber & Yoo, supra note 5, at 960–70, 981–87, 1003–18 
(tracing the development of access requirements for local telephony, networks of utility poles, and 
broadband networks); Michael O. Wise, Overview:  Deregulation and Antitrust in the Electric Power 
Industry, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 267 (1996) (discussing the emergence of access requirements in electric 
power). 
7  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring that access prices for unbundled network elements 
of local telephone systems be “based on the cost”); id. § 224(d)(1) (requiring that prices for access to 
networks of utility poles be based on “the additional costs of providing pole attachments”).  The FCC 
has implemented this provision by requiring that access prices be based on the historical cost associated 
with the portions of the network accessed.  47 C.F.R. § 1.1404(h)(2) (2004) (providing that “[d]ata and 
information should be based upon historical or original cost methodology, insofar as possible”). 
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The existing academic commentary has yet to fill this void.  The profu-
sion of scholarly writing on the economics of networks that has appeared 
over the last two decades has focused almost exclusively on the phenome-
non known as “network economic effects,” which arise when a network’s 
value is determined by the number of other users connected to it.8  Although 
this literature has yielded a number of cogent insights, its scope is limited 
by the fact that it focuses on only one aspect of networks:  their size.  As a 
result, it is unable to shed much light on the relative benefits of different 
network configurations or how individual components can interact with one 
another when integrated into a complex system.  
We believe that it is imperative that the debates about network policy 
shift to terms that better capture the key aspects of network behavior.  Such 
an approach should reflect the fact that the design decisions regarding a par-
ticular network component are influenced in no small part by the relation-
ship of that component to the other network components.  Networks are 
constructed with a view toward the performance and structure of the system 
as a whole and, thus, cannot be understood solely by examining individual 
components in isolation.  In short, network theory must reflect the extent to 
which the whole exceeds the sum of the parts.  In addition, networks evolve 
over time through the actions of network users, changes in types of access 
to the networks, and interconnections between networks.  The type of sys-
temic approach we envision would reflect how changes to one part of the 
network can affect the performance and evolution of the network in ways 
that can be dramatic and unpredictable. 
In this Essay, we would like to propose a new conceptual framework 
that promises to place network policy on a more analytically sound founda-
tion.  To illustrate some of the main insights of our approach, we draw on a 
branch of mathematics known as “graph theory.”9  Graph theory began as 
 
8  The literature on network externalities is vast.  For the seminal articles, see Joseph Farrell & Garth 
Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz 
& Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).  
For a useful survey appearing in the legal literature, see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Im-
plications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 480 (1998). 
9  For relatively accessible introductions to the subject, see JOHN M. ALDOUS & ROBIN J. WILSON, 
GRAPHS AND APPLICATIONS:  AN INTRODUCTORY APPROACH (2000); JONATHAN GROSS & JAY YELLEN, 
GRAPH THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS (1999); W.D. WALLIS, A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO GRAPH THEORY 
(2000); DOUGLAS B. WEST, INTRODUCTION TO GRAPH THEORY (1996).  For more sophisticated presen-
tations of the subject, see, for example, HANDBOOK OF GRAPH THEORY (Jonathan L. Gross & Jay Yellen 
eds., 2004); REINHARD DIESTEL, GRAPH THEORY (2d ed. 2000); DIETER JUNGNICKEL, GRAPHS 
NETWORKS AND ALGORITHMS (Tilla Schade trans., 1999).  For a historical survey of graph theory, see 
NORMAN L. BIGGS ET AL., GRAPH THEORY 1736–1936 (1976).  The rapidly developing science of net-
works is chronicled in a number of popular works.  See ALBERT-LASZLO BARABÁSI, LINKED:  THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS:  SMALL WORLDS AND THE 
GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES:  THE SCIENCE OF 
A CONNECTED AGE (2003).  For a rudimentary application of graph theory to telecommunications pol-
icy, see William W. Sharkey, Representation of Technology and Production, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 180, 186–202 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002).  
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an academic discipline in 1736 with legendary mathematician Leonhard 
Euler.  Euler studied whether it was possible to cross each of the seven 
bridges interconnecting the two banks of the Pregel River and the island of 
Kneiphof, located within the city of Königsberg, without crossing any 
bridge more than once.10  Other classic problems in graph theory include the 
“traveling salesman problem,” which attempts to determine the shortest or 
cheapest route that passes through a series of destinations exactly once be-
fore ending where the journey had begun,11 and the “four color problem,” 
which focuses on the minimum number of colors needed to color a map so 
that no adjacent countries have the same color.12  Mathematicians, physi-
cists, biologists, and sociologists have also employed graph theory to de-
velop an elaborate science of networks used to model such varied 
interactive phenomena as chemical and nuclear reactions, biological proc-
esses, the spread of epidemics, the structure of ecosystems, and the forma-
tion of social networks.13  More recently, graph theory has been employed 
by computer and communications-network designers seeking insights into 
the complexities of network behavior.14   
Despite the analytical power that graph theory provides, its insights 
have yet to be applied to broad issues of network policy.  The oversight is 
 
10  Leonhard Euler, Solutio Problematis ad Geometriam Situs Pertinentis [Solution of a Problem Re-
lating to the Geometry of Position], 8 COMMENTARII ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM IMPERIALIS 
PETROPOLITANAE 128 (1736), reprinted in BIGGS ET AL., supra note 9, at 3–11.  The proof is quite sim-
ple.  Euler realized that every node except for the beginning and ending nodes of the path must necessar-
ily have an even number of links leading away from it if the type of path that Euler sought were to exist.  
Because the network created by the Königsberg bridges contained four nodes with an odd number of 
links, no such path existed.  See BARABÁSI, supra note 9, at 12. 
11  The traveling salesman problem is a subset of the series of problems inspired by William Rowan 
Hamilton.  A “Hamiltonian path” is a path that crosses each node of a network without crossing any 
node more than once.  A “Hamiltonian cycle” is a Hamiltonian path that begins and ends at the same 
node.  The traveling salesman problem seeks out the shortest or least-cost Hamiltonian cycle.  The trav-
eling salesman problem plays a prominent role in a leading patent case.  See In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that a computer system for solving the traveling salesman problem is unpat-
entable subject matter), withdrawn on reh’g, 60 F.3d 807 (1995) (en banc). 
12  See Kenneth Appel & Wolfgang Haken, Every Planar Map Is Four Colorable:  Part I:  Dis-
charging, 21 ILL. J. MATH. 429 (1977); Kenneth Appel et al., Every Planar Map Is Four Colorable:  
Part II:  Reducibility, 21 ILL. J. MATH. 491 (1977). 
13  See, e.g., STEPHEN N. SHORE, THE TAPESTRY OF MODERN ASTROPHYSICS 305 (2002); OLEG N. 
TEMKIN ET AL., CHEMICAL REACTION NETWORKS:  A GRAPH-THEORETICAL APPROACH (1996); H. 
Jeong et al., The Large-Scale Organization of Metabolic Networks, 407 NATURE 651 (2000); Peter Yod-
zis, Diffuse Effects in Food Webs, 81 ECOLOGY 261 (2000).  Graph theory also underlies the assertion 
that every person in the planet is connected through no more than six degrees of separation.  See Stanley 
Milgram, The Small World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 60 (1967) (finding that letters sent to random 
residents of Omaha, Nebraska, only needed to pass through an average six people before reaching a tar-
get person in Boston, Massachusetts).  The concept of six degrees of separation has been reflected in 
popular culture in a play that was subsequently turned into a popular film, see JOHN GUARE, SIX 
DEGREES OF SEPARATION (1990); SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION (1993), as well as a popular parlor 
game involving Kevin Bacon, see, e.g., BARABÁSI, supra note 9, at 58–60. 
14  See THOMAS G. ROBERTAZZI, PLANNING TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS (1999). 
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regrettable since graph theory provides powerful analytical tools capable of 
addressing the central shortcoming of the current regulatory framework by 
reflecting how interactions among network components can cause systemic 
effects that cannot be understood solely by studying individual network 
elements in isolation.  The architecture of a network fundamentally affects 
the network’s ability to handle communications traffic.  Network perform-
ance can be measured in terms of the volume of traffic the network can 
handle, the reliability of operating systems, the accuracy of information 
transmission, and the speed of transmission.  A network’s usage patterns, 
much like the traffic flows on city streets, can create congestion and affect 
the performance of the network.  The study of networks using graph theory, 
therefore, can help regulators and policymakers recognize how networks 
function as complex systems.  
In addition, the graph theoretical approach that we propose offers 
starkly different policy implications than does the “network economic ef-
fects” view, an alternative approach to creating a regulatory framework.  By 
focusing only on network size, discussions based on network economic ef-
fects argue that interconnection is a benefit for the host network and that in-
terconnection should be provided free of charge.15  In contrast, by 
considering networks as complex systems, we support the well-established 
understanding that interconnection creates costs for the host network that 
can require intercarrier payments. 
The balance of this Essay is organized as follows:  Part II lays out the 
basic terminology employed by graph theory to describe networks.  Part III 
analyzes the insights that graph theory provides into the economics underly-
ing decisions about network configuration.  Part IV employs a graph theo-
retic principle known as the “max-flow/min-cut theorem” to explore the 
impact that interactions among different network components can have on 
network capacity.  Part V demonstrates the power of our proposed approach 
by outlining how it would apply to a number of leading issues confronting 
policymakers.  These issues include the decision to apply the same method-
ology to set prices for interconnection and access to unbundled network ele-
ments under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the decision to base 
access rates on cost, proposals to base access prices on market benchmarks, 
whether to compel access to broadband networks, and the regulation of 
Internet telephony.  We also explore the extent to which the framework can 
 
15  See David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity:  Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network Competi-
tion, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999); Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 369, 371 (2004) (“[T]he takings/intercarrier payment assumption is, in fact, faulty.  
Interconnection does not necessarily involve one company ‘using’ another’s network in a manner requir-
ing one network to pay the other.  Indeed, such assertion is economically suspect because interconnec-
tion confers a benefit to both networks—that of a larger calling universe, i.e., network effects—which 
renders each network more valuable.”).  Advocates stop short of suggesting the host network should pay 
for the supposed benefits it receives from providing the interconnection, but instead suggest that only the 
incremental cost of establishing the interconnection should be covered.  
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be employed to support a formal calculation of regulated rates.  Even this 
preliminary sketch is more than sufficient to establish the benefits of shift-
ing to an approach that is better able to capture the extent to which networks 
operate as integrated systems. 
II. NETWORKS AS COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
One of the central impediments to progress in the regulatory analysis 
of networks has been the lack of an established nomenclature for describing 
and analyzing the essential features of network structure.  We expand upon 
the principles of graph theory to offer a methodology for describing com-
munications networks that captures the complex manner in which individ-
ual network components interact with one another.16   
The basic units of analysis under our approach consist of nodes and 
links.17  Nodes are the junctions that represent the critical points of origin, 
routing, and termination.  In a conventional wireline telephone system, 
nodes tend to be physical locations at which one or more specialized pieces 
of equipment are installed.  Examples include customer premises, where 
calls originate and terminate, and central offices, where telephone compa-
nies maintain switching equipment.  That said, nodes need not be confined 
to specific, physical locations.  For example, mobile phones constitute 
nodes of a wireless telephone system despite their portability.  Nodes can 
even jump from one network to another.  This can occur, for example, when 
mobile phones roam across different wireless providers or when laptop 
computers with wireless local area network (“LAN”) cards move between 
WiFi access points. 
Links are any type of connection between nodes.  Links can be fixed in 
location, such as telephone or fiber-optic communication lines.  Links need 
not represent specific geographic corridors, however.  For example, a 
transmitter within a wireless telephone system may be in a specific geo-
graphic location, but the communication links with mobile phones are tem-
porary and vary with the location of the phones.   
 
16  We note as a preliminary matter that our analysis focuses exclusively on the branch of graph the-
ory dealing with what we will call “managed networks,” in which a single actor makes all of the deci-
sions with respect to the network.  We forego discussion of what we call “spontaneous networks,” in 
which the particular network structure is the result of the decisions by a large number of decentralized 
and uncoordinated participants.  See Matthew O. Jackson, A Survey of Models of Network Formation:  
Stability and Efficiency, in GROUP FORMATION IN ECONOMICS:  NETWORKS, CLUBS AND COALITIONS 
11, 12 (Gabrielle Demange & Myrna Holtz Wooders eds., 2005).  Although it is arguable that the latter 
type may ultimately become the more important way to analyze communications technologies, for the 
time being, the dominance of a handful of infrastructure providers justifies analyzing them as managed 
networks. 
17  Nodes and links are in many ways analogous to the terms vertices and edges that appear in much 
of the literature on graph theory.  We have modified the terminology to make them more specific to the 
particular technological contexts discussed here. 
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In practice, the costs of links can vary widely depending on the loca-
tion and nature of the particular nodes being connected.  In graph theory, 
these cost variations are represented by assigning different numerical values 
to the links and nodes.  Links and nodes also vary in terms of capacity, 
which is also represented by assigning different numerical values to the 
links and nodes.  The bandwidth of any particular transmission technology 
is typically limited.  Nodes are also often subject to capacity limitations, 
since switches and routers in a telecommunications network can be limited 
in the number of calls they can route at any one time.   
A system of nodes and links is called a graph.  When links only oper-
ate in a particular direction, the graph is called a directed graph, and the 
links are depicted with arrows to indicate the direction of flow.  A network 
is a graph with particular numerical values, such as cost or capacity, as-
signed to the links. 
The architecture of a network refers to the set of nodes and the pattern 
of the links that connects them.  A network functions as a system in the 
sense that it has various functionalities provided by various components as 
part of a larger set of interacting parts.  For example, a telecommunications 
system provides services by transmitting communications acting as an inte-
grated whole.  The concept of a system is not new.18  What is new, though, 
are better ways to understand the characteristics of complex systems.  A 
complex system refers to a system in which its elements interact in ways 
that transcend any organizing principles being applied to the network, al-
lowing the network to evolve and adapt to environmental changes.19  The 
great interest in complex systems stems from the development of mathe-
matical tools that provide insights into how networks perform and change.20  
Such techniques have been applied to study communications networks and 
the characteristics of connections in the World Wide Web.21 
Analyzing networks through the lens of graph theory helps to explain 
network-architecture covering systems, such as telecommunications, which 
 
18  The systems approach was particularly fashionable beginning in the 1960s, having been applied 
widely in the natural sciences, mathematics, computer science, and the social sciences.  The best-known 
classical applications are automated feedback and control systems.  The application of systems theory to 
the study of social systems or organizations often is based on a biological metaphor.  For example, von 
Bertalanffy states that “characteristic of organization, whether of a living organism or a society, are no-
tions like those of wholeness, growth, differentiation, hierarchical order, dominance, control, competi-
tion, etc.”  This vision encompasses a wide array of approaches as “systems theories,” including 
computer simulation, cybernetics, information theory, game theory, and decision theory.  LUDWIG VON 
BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY:  FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS 47 
(1968). 
19  See, e.g., J.M. Ottino, Complex Systems, 49 AICHE J. 292, 293 (2003). 
20  As Ottino points out, the mathematical techniques used to study complex systems include 
“nonlinear dynamics, differential and difference equations and time series analysis, cellular automata, 
graph and network theory, and, depending on the problem, aspects of game theory, Markov processes, 
information theory, and genetic algorithms.”  Id. at 294. 
21  See Reka Albert et al., Diameter of the World Wide Web, 401 NATURE 130 (1999). 
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are the product of engineering design.  Further, by applying the theory of 
random graphs, developments in the study of network evolution can provide 
insights into the forces that cause networks to evolve and adapt to their en-
vironment in various ways.  The usage patterns of a telecommunications 
network depend on the decisions of individual subscribers who seek to 
make connections to each other.  The connections to a network depend on 
the random arrival of customers seeking network services.  Most impor-
tantly, for our purposes, regulators also affect the evolution of networks 
when they adopt rules that grant access to networks to firms that are com-
petitors of network operators.  Regulations such as those based on the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 remove some of the control from the hands of 
network operators.  The result of such access regulation is that a network’s 
competitors exercise considerable discretion in determining at what points 
to connect to the network, what elements of the network to use, what addi-
tional switching equipment will be connected to the network, where the ad-
ditional equipment will be collocated, and what types of traffic are added to 
the network.  Network operators must alter network facilities and equip-
ment to adapt to these physical modifications of the network and to changes 
in traffic patterns.22  In short, under the regulated access regime, networks 
evolve through the access decisions of competitors.  The result is to in-
crease the complexity of network analysis still further. 
III. GRAPH THEORY AND NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
This Part explores the insights that graph theory provides into changes 
in network configuration.  Section A introduces one of the fundamental 
cost-minimizing concepts of graph theory, the minimum spanning tree, and 
traces how changes in the cost of individual elements can have a dramatic 
impact on network design.  Section B broadens the notion of network opti-
mality to include reliability, analyzing how concerns about network failure 
and quality of service can lead to the inclusion of redundant capacity within 
a network.  Section C explores how cost and capacity considerations inter-
act to form economies of scale that affect technology choices as well as de-
cisions about whether to aggregate traffic. 
A. Cost Minimization as a Determinant of Network Configuration 
Graph theory provides a framework for evaluating the performance of 
different network configurations.  In this section, we introduce the minimum 
spanning tree, which offers a logical starting point for exploring the in-
sights that graph theory provides into decisions about network configura-
tion.   
 
22  In other work, we also analyze the transaction-cost implications of access and discuss how access 
regimes affect decisions about the proper boundaries of the network.  See DANIEL F. SPULBER & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORK REGULATION:  THE MANY FACES OF ACCESS 40–60 (Vanderbilt Univ. 
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 05-19, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=740297. 
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1. The Minimum Spanning Tree.—One basic network configuration 
directly links every pair of nodes.  This type of network is represented by a 
complete graph.  If a network consists of n nodes, then its complete graph 
will have (1/2)n(n – 1) links.  For example, the network depicted in Figure 
1 has six nodes and fifteen links.  In the context of telecommunications, the 
complete graph corresponds to a point-to-point network.  A prominent fea-
ture of point-to-point networks is that they contain numerous cycles, which 
are paths along which it is possible to pass through a succession of links 
and eventually return to the original node without crossing any link more 
than once. 
 
Figure 1.  A point-to-point network of six nodes and fifteen links. 
 
A point-to-point network is most desirable when the cost of switching 
is relatively high and the cost of transmission is relatively low.  If links are 
relatively expensive, however, maintaining such an extensive set of dedi-
cated connections can be inefficient.  Under these circumstances, it may be 
more efficient to design a network that minimizes the number of links.  The 
network architecture that minimizes the number of links is a tree, which is a 
graph that connects nodes without creating any cycles.  A tree that connects 
all of the nodes in a network is known as a spanning tree.  In a network 
with n nodes, such a spanning tree would consist of n – 1 links.  According 
to Cayley’s Formula,23 the number of spanning trees in a graph with n nodes 
is nn–2.  Thus, for four nodes, there are the sixteen possibilities depicted in 
Figure 2.24  The number of spanning trees quickly becomes extremely large 
 
23  See Arthur Cayley, A Theorem on Trees, 23 Q.J. PURE APPLIED MATH. 376 (1889), reprinted in 
13 THE COLLECTED MATHEMATICAL PAPERS OF ARTHUR CAYLEY 26 (A.R. Forsyth ed., University 
Press 1897).  This is subject to the constraint that n be greater than or equal to two. 
24  Note that the foregoing discussion assumes that each of the four nodes is unique, either in terms 
of geographic location or cost.  If the nodes are fungible, all of the trees are topologically identical (i.e., 
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  Four of these 
as the number of nodes increases.  For ten nodes, there are 100 million pos-
sible configurations. 
Figure 2.  Spanning trees in a network with four nodes. 
 
If the costs of connecting any two nodes were exactly the same, de-
signing the least-cost network would simply be a matter of choosing one of 
the many available spanning trees.  In practice, the costs of links can vary 
widely depending on the location and nature of the particular nodes being 
connected.  In graph theory, these cost variations are represented by assign-
ing different numerical values to the links and nodes that comprise the net-
work. 
Variations in the cost of links can provide network designers with a ba-
sis for determining the relative cost of different spanning trees.  Given the 
manner in which the number of spanning trees expands exponentially as the 
number of nodes increases, one might think that identifying the minimum 
spanning tree for anything but the smallest network would require testing a 
large number of possibilities.  Fortunately, a number of very efficient meth-
ods exist to identify minimum spanning trees.  One example is Prim’s algo-
rithm, which proceeds as follows:  Choose any node as the initial node and 
find the least-cost link connected to that node.25  Add that link and its end 
node to form the start of the tree.  Find the least-cost link connected to that 
tree and add that link and its end node to the tree.  Continue until all nodes 
are included.  What results is the minimum spanning tree (as depicted in 
Figure 3). 
                                                                                                                           
isomorphic) except for the four arrow-shaped trees depicted in the lower right-hand corner. 
25  See R.C. Prim, Shortest Connection Networks and Some Generalizations, 36 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 
1389 (1957). 
    Complete graph 
  Four of these Four of these Four of these 
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Figure 3.  The minimum spanning tree. 
 
2. Impact of a Change in the Cost of a Network Element.—Even this 
simple problem of identifying the minimum spanning tree demonstrates the 
extent to which networks constitute integrated systems.  The links that 
comprise the cost-minimizing network are not chosen individually; they are 
instead selected in light of their relationship to the other network elements.  
The choices of which links to include and which to reject are thus interde-
pendent.  Whether a particular component should be part of the network de-
pends not only on the cost of that component but also on the cost of the 
other components of the network.  The decision also depends on the precise 
manner in which that component can be connected into the overall network.   
Consider the impact of changing the cost associated with a single net-
work component.  Because the least-cost network configuration that con-
nects all of the nodes of a network depends on the interrelationship of all of 
the network components, changing the cost associated with any network 
component has the potential to completely change what would be the least-
cost network configuration that still connects every node.  In other words, 
changes in the cost associated with a particular network component might 
lead to the creation of a completely different network.  In the most extreme 
case, the particular element whose cost was being affected might even be 
omitted as a component of the resulting network.   
Such an example is depicted in Figure 4.  The only difference between 
the top and the bottom pair of graphs is a change in the cost associated in 
the diagonal link connecting the node in the upper left corner with the node 
in the lower right corner.  This one change in cost causes a link that was 
previously part of the least-cost network configuration to be omitted from 
the network altogether. 
8 
12 
8 5 6 
15 
10 6 
The complete graph The minimum spanning tree 
5 
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Figure 4.  The impact of cost changes on the minimum spanning tree. 
 
By capturing these interactions, graph theory provides intuitions about 
the ways that networks constitute integrated systems.  The analytical tools 
provided by graph theory demonstrate how changes to one component of 
the network can affect the decisions about network configuration in surpris-
ing and unexpected ways.  In so doing, it underscores that a network cannot 
be evaluated solely in terms of the costs associated with its individual com-
ponents.  Instead, the analysis of networks requires an appreciation for the 
complex manner in which different network components interact with one 
another.  The role of each element can only be understood in the context of 
the system as a whole. 
B. Reliability as a Determinant of Network Configuration 
Cost is only one of the possible measures of network performance.  It 
is not enough that a network be inexpensive; users also typically demand a 
certain degree of network reliability.  We will discuss two different aspects 
of reliability:  (1) protection against network failure and (2) maintenance of 
quality of service. 
1. Network Failure.—Optimizing a network along any one dimen-
sion necessarily requires some degree of sacrifice along other dimensions.  
For example, because a minimum spanning tree contains no cycles, the path 
connecting any two nodes is unique.  This fact leaves tree architectures vul-
The complete graph 
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nerable to network failure, since a breakdown in any of the links or nodes 
necessarily will disconnect a portion of the network.26   
Reliability is accomplished by introducing a degree of redundancy so 
that the network can continue to satisfy communication demands even if 
some portion of the network fails.  This redundancy is accomplished by in-
troducing cycles into the network, which ensures that nodes are connected 
by more than one path.  The most extreme case of redundancy is the com-
plete graph with which we began our discussion.27  The optimal level of re-
dundancy designed into the network to protect against network failure 
depends on the tradeoff between cost and reliability.28 
2. Quality of Service.—Reliability concerns can arise even when 
every element of a network is functioning properly.  Reliability is also af-
fected by the fact that network components vary not just in terms of cost but 
also in terms of capacity.  When traffic arrives at a rate that exceeds the ca-
pacity of a particular network element, that traffic is forced into a queue.  
Saturation of the capacity of a particular network element, however, does 
not lead to outright network failure.  Instead, it simply causes degradation 
in the network’s quality of service.  Many applications are not especially 
sensitive to brief delays.  For example, a half-second delay may be imper-
ceptible to users accessing e-mail and web content.  Other applications, 
such as Internet telephony and streaming media, depend upon guaranteed 
throughput rates in order to function properly. 
The uniqueness of the paths connecting any two nodes in a tree archi-
tecture turns every network component into a potential bottleneck.  The 
saturation of the capacity of any particular network component thus has the 
inevitable effect of reducing the quality of service for all traffic that must 
pass through that component.  The greater the variability in network de-
mand, the more redundant capacity must be maintained.  The saturation of 
network components may be caused by short-run, transient variability in 
demand, in which case reliability problems are likely to be temporary and 
geographically limited.  Saturation can also result from more fundamental 
shifts in usage patterns, such as those that occur when network planners fail 
to properly anticipate the geographic development of neighborhoods, in 
which case reliability problems may be more enduring and may affect a lar-
ger area. 
 
26  Graph theory provides two measures of a graph’s connectedness.  One measure is to remove 
nodes and see whether the remaining graph still reaches all of the nodes.  A graph with at least k + 1 
nodes is k-connected if it is still connected after removing k – 1 or fewer nodes.  The other measure is to 
remove links to see whether the remaining graph still reaches all of the nodes.  A graph is said to be k-
link-connected if it is still connected after removing k – 1 or fewer links. 
27  See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
28  See ALDOUS & WILSON, supra note 9, at 236–38; Prakash Mirchandani & David Simchi-Levi, 
Communication Network Design Models, in HANDBOOK OF GRAPH THEORY, supra note 9, at 1117, 
1126–30. 
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As a result, network designers concerned with maintaining quality of 
service will employ cycles to design a degree of redundancy into the net-
work, as depicted in Figure 5.  Cycles can be created by adding redundant 
capacity along an existing link (indicated by link A) or by creating an alter-
native path between two nodes not previously linked together (indicated by 
link B).  The presence of alternative pathways provides a safety valve that 
preserves quality of service. 
 
 
Figure 5.  The use of cycles to maintain quality of service. 
C. Interactions Between Cost and Capacity:  Economies of Scale 
The preceding sections have shown how cost and capacity independ-
ently affect the optimal network configuration.  Cost and capacity interact 
when a higher capacity network technology exists that lowers the variable 
costs of providing network service but increases the fixed costs.  When this 
occurs, the node or link technology is said to exhibit economies of scale.29   
The presence of economies of scale can have a dramatic impact on 
network design.  For example, if there are sufficient economies of scale in 
links, the network designer may choose a configuration that consolidates 
traffic.  To illustrate this effect, consider a network with nodes that are lo-
cated in two clusters, as depicted in Figure 6.  Network designers must de-
cide how best to link the two hubs:  they can use a low-volume linking 
technology or a higher-capacity trunk line.  If the volume of traffic is suffi-
ciently large, the savings in variable costs associated with employing a 
trunk line will justify the incurrence of the larger fixed costs needed to do 
so.  The minimum number of customers needed for a trunk line to be eco-
nomically beneficial can be determined by dividing the fixed costs of estab-
lishing the trunk line by the per-customer cost savings resulting from trunk-
 
29  See generally DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 115–18 (1989) (discussing 
sources of economies of scale). 
A 
B 
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line transmission.  In other words, the greater the cost savings, the smaller 
the number of customers needed for the trunk-line architecture to pay out.   
 
 
Figure 6.  The choice between redundant links and trunk lines. 
 
The preceding examples show that network designers may aggregate 
traffic to achieve economies of scale.30  The use of central switching in hub-
and-spoke configurations and the establishment of trunk lines take advan-
tage of economies of scale in nodes and links through the use of high-
capacity switches and transmission lines.  Again, the optimal network con-
figuration is highly sensitive to the costs of different switching and linking 
technologies.31  In addition, the decision to employ a trunk line also impli-
cates the tradeoff between cost and reliability, since placing reliance on a 
single, higher-volume link increases the risk of network failure. 
The extent to which network designers deviate from a tree architecture 
thus depends upon a wide range of considerations, including the cost and 
capacity of individual components, the relative cost of switching and link-
ing, the overall level and variability of network demand, the presence of 
economies of scale, and the benefits from aggregation provided by particu-
lar technologies.  Decisions about network configuration also depend on the 
tradeoff between cost and reliability as well as a wide range of characteris-
tics unique to the particular network.  Most importantly, the analytical tools 
discussed above demonstrate the importance of conceptualizing networks as 
 
30  See ROBERTAZZI, supra note 14; B. Yaged, Jr., Minimum Cost Routing for Static Network Mod-
els, 1 NETWORKS 139 (1971). 
31  Another source of returns to scale is the economies of scope that arise when a single network han-
dles multiple types of random traffic.  The law of large numbers dictates that unless the demand for the 
product is completely positively correlated, bundling the products together typically reduces their cumu-
lative variability.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1579, 1707–08 n.471 (2003).  As a result, aggregating traffic can allow network owners to 
maintain quality of service in a more efficient manner by reducing the variability of the demands on 
network capacity.   
Trunk-line networkRedundant-link network 
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integrated systems that are more than the sum of their parts and appreciating 
the extent to which network design hinges on understanding the complex 
interrelationship among network components.   
IV. GRAPH THEORY AND NETWORK CAPACITY 
In addition to providing insights into how the interrelationships among 
particular network components affect the network’s overall cost and reli-
ability, graph theory also reveals how network configuration affects the 
network’s maximum capacity.  Section A introduces a well-known princi-
ple in graph theory known as the max-flow/min-cut theorem, which pro-
vides a way to determine the maximum carrying capacity of any 
transportation network and the costs associated with operating it at that 
level.32  Section B traces the implications of the max-flow/min-cut theorem 
for network policy. 
A. The Max-Flow/Min-Cut Theorem 
Although a formal proof of the max-flow/min-cut theorem exceeds the 
scope of this Essay, the basic intuitions underlying it can be easily ex-
plained in a relatively nontechnical manner.  The theorem focuses on the 
maximum flow capacity of a network transporting traffic from a source 
(usually denoted s) to a destination (called a “sink” and usually denoted t).33  
A cut is a set of links that, if removed, divide the graph into two subgraphs.  
The two subgraphs contain distinct sets of nodes.  Of greatest relevance, for 
our purposes, are those cuts in which the source (node s) and the sink (node 
t) lie in different sets.  The set of nodes containing the source node s is typi-
cally called S, while the set of nodes containing the sink node t is typically 
called T.  The key insight is that any traffic bound from node s to node t 
necessarily must travel from nodes contained in set S to nodes contained in 
set T and hence along the links in the cut.  As a result, the total carrying ca-
 
32  This theorem is prominently discussed in most graph theory texts.  For a relatively accessible ex-
position, see Clifford Stein, Maximum Flows, in HANDBOOK OF GRAPH THEORY, supra note 9, at 1075. 
33  The network is portrayed as a one-way network from a single source to a single sink.  Certain as-
pects of this simplification do not affect the generality of the analysis.  For example, the insights pro-
vided by the analysis of s-t networks can be extended to networks with multiple sources and multiple 
sinks without any loss of generality.  See WALLIS, supra note 9, at 160–61.  In addition, the foregoing 
exposition focuses solely on the capacity of links without taking into account the capacity limits on 
nodes.  A node with a capacity constraint can be reconceptualized as two uncapacitated nodes connected 
by a capacity-constrained link.  As a result, the entire analysis can focus solely on the capacity of links 
without loss of generality.   
Other aspects are potentially more problematic.  The most significant concern is that telecommunica-
tions networks tend to be two-way rather than one-way.  It is theoretically feasible to model these flows 
as two different networks, although if the capacity of certain nodes is used for traffic passing in both di-
rections, some means for trading off capacity must be devised.  The problem can also be analyzed as a 
multicommodity flow problem.  Multicommodity problems pose additional difficulties that sometimes 
border on the intractable.  See Stein, supra note 32, at 1083–84. 
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pacity of the links directly connecting one of the nodes in set S to the set of 
nodes in set T represents a constraint on the total carrying capacity of the 
network.   
This insight is most easily understood by analyzing the simplest cuts in 
the context of the relatively simple network depicted in Figure 7.  That net-
work consists of eight nodes connected by a series of links; the capacity of 
each link is indicated on the graph.34  Consider the cut represented by the 
dotted line labeled A.  In this cut, which consists of the links connecting 
node s to nodes a, b, and f, set S consists of only node s, while set T consists 
of the remaining seven nodes (a, b, c, d, e, f, and t).  Any traffic leaving 
node s must necessarily travel along one of the links connecting node s to 
nodes a, b, or f.  As a result, it is clear that the total carrying capacity of the 
network from s to t can be no greater than the sum of the capacity of those 
links, which in this case is 38 + 1 + 2 = 41.  A similar logic obtains with re-
spect to cut B, which divides the network into a set S consisting of seven 
nodes (s, a, b, c, d, e, and f )  and a set T consisting only of node t.  Because 
only four links connect to node t, it is also clear that the total capacity of the 
network cannot exceed the total capacity of those four links, which in this 
case is 7 + 7 + 1 + 18 = 33.  Because every traffic flow must necessarily 
pass through both of these cuts, the capacity of the links crossing these cuts 
represents a constraint on the flow capacity of the entire system.  In other 
words, the network cannot possibly carry more than the lower of 41 or 33.   
 
Figure 7.  Illustration of the max-flow/min-cut theorem. 
 
 
34  Figure 7 is adapted from JUNGNICKEL, supra note 9, at 164–69. 
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One can generalize from this insight by analyzing the entire universe of 
possible cuts to the network.  The cut with the smallest capacity (called the 
minimum cut) represents the maximum flow that one can push through the 
system.35  The minimum cut in any network can be identified by using an 
iterative algorithm.  In this case, the cut with the minimum capacity is the 
one depicted by cut C, which has a capacity of 31.  Because all traffic trav-
eling between nodes s and t must necessarily travel across cut C, the total 
capacity of the links crossed by cut C necessarily represents the maximum 
carrying capacity of the network.  In addition, the algorithm for identifying 
the minimum cut also determines the flow passing along each noncritical 
link when the network is operating at full capacity.  This makes it possible 
to determine the direct costs of the operating network when carrying its 
maximum volume.36 
B. Implications of the Max-Flow/Min-Cut Theorem for Network Policy 
Now consider the impact on the network of granting a competitor ac-
cess to a network element.  Access ties up some of the capacity of the 
leased elements, which in turn reduces the capacity available to the network 
owner.  One of the most interesting insights of graph theory is that changing 
the capacity of any particular network component can have a surprising and 
somewhat unpredictable impact on the capacity of the network.  Indeed, 
changes in capacity can cause the links that comprise the minimum cut 
(which represent the constraint on the total carrying capacity of the net-
work) to change to a completely different set of links.   
Consider, for example, the situation depicted in Figure 8, which is the 
same network represented in Figure 7, except now a competitor has ob-
tained access to six units of the capacity of the link connecting nodes c and 
e (marked on the graph with a circle).  From the perspective of the network 
owner, this has the effect of reducing the available capacity of that link by 
that amount.  In this case, the magnitude of this reduction causes the links 
comprising the minimum cut to change to the one portrayed by the line 
marked D.  As a result, granting a competitor access to a link that was not 
part of the minimum cut (and thus had slack in its capacity) nonetheless re-
duces the effective capacity of the entire network.  The amount of the re-
duction is not necessarily equal to the magnitude of the access granted.  
Instead, the amount of reduction depends upon the configuration of the par-
ticular network involved.  In the situation portrayed in Figure 8, the impact 
of allowing a competitor to occupy six units of capacity in the link connect-
 
35  Although it is quite intuitive that the maximum carrying capacity of a transport network must be 
less than or equal to the capacity of the minimum cut, the max-flow/min-cut theorem actually estab-
lishes that the maximum flow of the network is strictly equal to the capacity of the minimum cut. 
36  If the network is not operating at full capacity, the optimization problem instead focuses on iden-
tifying the minimum cost flow and requires a slightly different approach.  See Lisa Fleischer, Minimum 
Cost Flows, in HANDBOOK OF GRAPH THEORY, supra note 9, at 1087. 
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ing node c with node e is to reduce the effective capacity of the entire net-
work by two.  The value of carrying two units from node s to node t repre-
sents the opportunity cost of granting this competitor access to the link 
between nodes c and e.  In addition, the change in direct costs associated 
with granting access can be determined by recalculating the flow passing 
along each noncritical link when the post-access network is operating at full 
capacity. 
 
Figure 8.  Impact of unbundled access on network capacity. 
 
At the same time, it is quite possible that granting access to a particular 
link might have no effect on the total carrying capacity of the network.  
Whether that is the case depends on how much slack exists in the link to 
which access is being granted.  If the link to which access is being granted 
is not part of the minimum cut and the additional reduction in capacity does 
not make it part of the minimum cut, granting access has no impact on the 
overall capacity or the full-capacity operating costs of the network.  On the 
other hand, if the link is already part of the minimum cut or if granting ac-
cess to that link places it on the minimum cut, granting access to that link 
reduces the total carrying capacity of the network.   
Therefore, the retail value of the reduction in network capacity repre-
sents a good measure of the opportunity cost associated with granting ac-
cess to competitors.  Note, however, that the reduction in capacity is not 
necessarily equal to the size of access granted.  The rest of the network may 
compensate for the reduction in the capacity of one link in ways that par-
tially offset the impact of the reduction.  In practice, access by competitors 
is not an isolated event but a pattern of usage that changes over time as 
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more competitors access the network.  The network’s available carrying ca-
pacity will evolve over time as a consequence of the access decisions of 
competitors. 
V. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A GRAPH THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The ability of graph theory to reflect the interactions among network 
components offers insights that can guide policymaking.  This Part will 
sketch how the graph theoretical approach that we propose might shed new 
light on a number of leading issues confronting policymakers.  These in-
clude the decision to apply the same methodology to set prices for intercon-
nection and access to unbundled network elements under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the decision to base access rates on cost, 
proposals to base access prices on market benchmarks, compelled access to 
broadband networks, and the regulation of Internet telephony.  We also ex-
plore the extent to which the framework can be employed to support a for-
mal calculation of regulated rates.  Although a complete analysis of these 
issues exceeds the scope of this Essay, the brief discussion we offer here on 
each policy choice should be sufficient to convey a general sense of graph 
theory’s potential to inform network policy. 
A. The Impact of Interconnection and UNE Access 
Perhaps the key innovation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
was the attempt to introduce competition into local telephone service.  Con-
gress envisioned that competition in local telephone markets might emerge 
through one of three paths.37  First, a new entrant might obtain all of the 
necessary elements from the existing local telephone company, called an 
incumbent local exchange carrier (“LEC”), and resell them.38  Second, a 
new entrant might construct an entirely new network.39  Congress recog-
nized, however, that not every facilities-based entrant would be able to have 
its entire network in place at the time it began to offer local service.40  In or-
der to allow competition to emerge before entrants had fully established 
their networks, Congress established a third path for entering local tele-
phone markets.  It required every incumbent LEC to provide other carriers 
with access to all of its network elements on an unbundled basis.41  The 
 
37  See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491–92 (2002); Implementation of the 
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 
F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,509 ¶ 12 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order].   
38  See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2004).  Resale rates are based on retail rates charged to subscribers for 
the telecommunications service requested less the costs that will be avoided by the LEC, such as the 
costs attributable to marketing, billing, and collection.  Id. § 252(d)(3). 
39  Id. § 251(c)(2). 
40  S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 147–48 (1996). 
41  47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).  In determining which network elements would be subject to the unbun-
dled access requirement, the statute required the FCC to consider whether “access to such network ele-
ments as are proprietary in nature is necessary” and whether “the failure to provide access to such 
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statute requires that the terms of interconnection and access to unbundled 
network elements (“UNEs”) be “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”42 
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) implemented the 
local competition provisions of the 1996 Act in a massive order issued just 
six months after the statute’s enactment.43  The order required that resale 
prices be based on retail prices less the costs that are avoided when tele-
communications services are provided at wholesale rather than retail (such 
as the costs associated with marketing, billing, and collection).44  Rates for 
both interconnection and access to UNEs would be determined under a 
methodology known as Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost 
(“TELRIC”).  TELRIC bases rates on the sum of the incremental costs di-
rectly attributable to the specified element and a reasonable allocation of 
common costs, both determined on a forward-looking, replacement-cost ba-
sis.45  The Supreme Court upheld TELRIC as a matter of statutory construc-
tion in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC.46  Although the FCC has 
begun to reconsider certain aspects of TELRIC, the notice of proposed 
rulemaking that initiated this proceeding made clear that the FCC envi-
sioned only modest adjustments to the relevant cost categories and reaf-
firmed the basic decision to base both interconnection and UNE access 
pricing on forward-looking cost.47   
Basing rates for both interconnection and access to UNEs on the 
TELRIC methodology leads to incorrect outcomes.  In essence, TELRIC 
adopts a bottom-up approach that determines UNE access and interconnec-
tion rates by aggregating costs on an element-by-element basis.  This ap-
proach neglects the effects of capacity utilization on the overall 
performance of the network. 
                                                                                                                           
network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide 
the services that it seeks to offer.”  Id. § 251(d)(2)(A), (B) (emphasis added). 
42  Id. § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3); see also § 252(d)(1)(A) (requiring that interconnection and UNE access 
rates be based on cost and nondiscriminatory). 
43  Local Competition Order, supra note 37, at 15,509 ¶ 12. 
44  Id. at 15,955–64 ¶¶ 908–934. 
45  47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a) (2004).  As a formal matter, TELRIC properly refers only to the first of 
these two components.  For simplicity, however, we will refer to both parts of the methodology collec-
tively as TELRIC.  In addition, the FCC did not formally require incumbent LECs to set interconnection 
and UNE access rates in accordance with TELRIC.  Instead, the statute provides that parties remain free 
to establish the terms of interconnection and UNE access through private negotiations.  That said, nego-
tiations that fail are subject first to mediation and then arbitration by the state public utility commissions 
(“PUCs”).  See 47 U.S.C. § 252.  Because the FCC’s rules require that any such arbitration be settled in 
accordance with TELRIC, TELRIC-based prices strongly influence the outcome of those negotiations 
and constitute a de facto ceiling for interconnection and UNE access rates.  
46  535 U.S. 467 (2002). 
47  See Review of the Commission’s Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements 
and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 
F.C.C.R. 18,945, 18,957–60 ¶¶ 29–37 (2003) [hereinafter TELRIC NPRM]. 
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Consider first interconnection.  The 1996 Act gives competitors the 
right to request interconnection “at any technically feasible point.”48  Graph 
theory demonstrates the potential flaw in the idea that the costs of intercon-
nection are confined to the network elements that are directly involved.  In-
stead, interconnection by competitors is likely to introduce new sources and 
sinks into the network.  Thus, substantial amounts of traffic may originate 
and terminate at points in the network that differ from the host network’s 
initial points of origin and termination.  This will alter traffic patterns.  A 
network that is designed with a maximum flow/minimum cut pattern de-
signed around particular sources and sinks will no longer be appropriate for 
traffic coming from new sources and sinks.  The nodes at which intercon-
nection occurs will not be the only nodes affected.  Rather, the effects will 
be distributed across all nodes and links within the network.  This invali-
dates the notion that only the incremental costs of providing the intercon-
nection should be recovered.  The interconnection affects the network’s 
performance and creates costs throughout the network. 
Moreover, graph theory shows that one should not expect the effects of 
UNE access to be confined to those elements.  When individual elements 
are viewed in isolation, the TELRIC methodology seems quite reasonable.  
Typically, UNE access occupies only a few of the elements of an incumbent 
LEC’s network.  Those elements, however, can be critical to overall traffic 
patterns that connect the network’s sources and sinks.  The reduction of 
available capacity on critical links in the network will affect the network’s 
maximum flow.  Thus, UNE access can impose costs on the host network 
that extend well beyond the elements that are affected.  In some cases, the 
costs of UNE access may even exceed interconnection costs.  If usage pat-
terns associated with interconnection are similar to those of the incumbent 
LEC’s own traffic, absent any capacity constraints, there will be less of an 
impact on the network owner’s decisions about network configuration.  
There will be no change in the network elements that comprise the mini-
mum cut and, thus, in the components that constitute bottlenecks.  The 
situation is quite different when usage patterns associated with interconnec-
tion differ from the patterns of the incumbent’s own traffic.  When that is 
the case, granting access to critical UNEs can create bottlenecks where none 
previously existed and can have a dramatic impact on the network’s maxi-
mum flow.  Under these circumstances, UNE access can have a dramatic 
impact on the cost, capacity, and configuration of networks.   
B. The Shortcomings of the Cost-Based Pricing 
Graph theory reveals problems with the prices charged for both inter-
connection and UNE access as well.  As noted earlier, the FCC has effec-
tively ruled that both interconnection and UNE access prices be determined 
 
48  47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B). 
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in accordance with TELRIC, which builds rates from the bottom-up by ag-
gregating the costs (determined on a forward-looking basis) of each indi-
vidual network component.  Other access regimes employ similar cost-
based methodologies.49 
Graph theory highlights a significant flaw in basing access prices on 
the costs associated with a particular network element.  Cost-based ap-
proaches necessarily focus solely on the characteristics of the network ele-
ment in isolation.  As a result, they fail to take into account the manner in 
which that element interacts with the system as a whole.  In so doing, the 
current approach fails to take into account one of the central characteristics 
of networks, which is how changes to one component can affect the entire 
system.  Most importantly, allowing a competitor to occupy a portion of the 
capacity of a particular component can cause a cascade effect as the rest of 
the network attempts to compensate by rerouting traffic through other por-
tions of the network.   
An example based on the simple network portrayed in Figure 9 demon-
strates the shortcomings of the current approach.  It represents a classic ring 
configuration carrying traffic originating and terminating on nodes a, b, c, 
and d.   
 
 
 
Figure 9.  A ring network with four nodes. 
 
Suppose that a competitor requested unbundled access to a portion of 
the capacity of the link connecting nodes a and b.  According to the current 
approach, the price paid by the competitor for this access would be deter-
mined by the replacement cost of the capacity of that link plus a share of the 
common costs.  Is this pricing regime likely to represent a reasonably accu-
rate reflection of the true costs to the network owner? 
 
49  See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.1409 (using a cost-based methodology to establish rates for access to 
networks of utility poles). 
d 
b 
c a 
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The answer is almost certainly no.  From the perspective of the net-
work owner, granting the competitor access to the link between nodes a and 
b has the effect of reducing the effective capacity of this link.  If this link is 
operating well below capacity, granting access to the competitor would 
have a negligible impact on the system.  The costs would be so low that al-
lowing the network owner to recover on the basis of network cost would 
likely overcompensate the network owner. 
A different situation arises if the link between nodes a and b is already 
part of the minimum cut or if the access request makes it part of the mini-
mum cut.  If the link between nodes a and b becomes saturated, the network 
will have to reroute calls between those nodes via nodes c and d.  Because 
this traffic must pass through three links and three nodes, rather than one 
link and one node, the reduction in capacity will cause the network owner 
to incur three times the cost (assuming that the costs associated with each 
node and each link are symmetrical).  Thus, even when only considering 
traffic between nodes a and b, it becomes clear that the overall impact to the 
network cannot be determined solely by analyzing the costs associated with 
the link between nodes a and b.   
The impact of the system becomes even more dramatic when the traffic 
between the other nodes is taken into account.  Not only does forcing the 
network to reroute calls between nodes a and b through nodes c and d affect 
the cost of servicing calls between nodes a and b, it also has a potential im-
pact on traffic among the other nodes.  Consider, for example, traffic pass-
ing between node a and node c.  In the absence of an access request, the 
network owner could route some of the traffic between nodes a and c via 
node b and route the rest of the traffic via node d.  The situation changes, 
however, if a request for access causes the link between nodes a and b to 
become saturated.  In that event, the network owner has no choice but to in-
crease the proportion of the traffic between nodes a and c routed through 
node d.  This has the potential to degrade all of the traffic passing through 
nodes a, c, and d, including both transit traffic between nodes a and c and 
local traffic between nodes a and d and between nodes c and d.  In addition, 
the link between node b and c is no longer carrying any traffic between 
nodes a and c, which essentially renders superfluous the capacity designed 
into this link to carry this traffic.  The short-run impact of the UNE access 
requirement of the Telecommunication Act of 1996, thus, cannot be deter-
mined simply by looking at the affected elements in isolation.   
Granting access to a particular link can have even more significant 
long-run effects by altering the design of a network to connect a set of 
nodes.  Recall that decisions whether to aggregate traffic to take advantage 
of economies of scale turn on whether sufficient traffic exists to defray the 
costs.  Reducing the effective capacity of a link can render a particular ag-
gregation decision unprofitable.  Alternatively, as noted earlier, a change in 
the cost or capacity of one or more links can change the optimal network 
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configuration to the point where the particular link in question would not be 
part of the network at all. 
The problem of determining rates is made all the worse by mandating 
interconnection “at any technically feasible point.”50  This requirement pre-
vents the network owner from minimizing the adverse impact to its system 
by choosing which facilities to employ when fulfilling any particular re-
quest for service.  In the worst case scenario, the right to designate the point 
of interconnection gives competitors the opportunity to act strategically by 
basing their access requests not on their needs, but rather on what would in-
flict the greatest harm on the network owner.  A network owner may wish 
to hedge against this possibility by maintaining excess capacity in case one 
of its competitors decides to request access to a key portion of its network.  
This has the drawback of forcing the network owner to make capital in-
vestments that may never be used.  Indeed, competitors that are acting stra-
tegically may well take into account whether the network owner maintains 
such excess capacity when deciding whether and where to request access.  
If so, the mere fact that the network owner has added excess capacity to 
hedge against the possibility of a strategic access request effectively guaran-
tees that access will be sought elsewhere. 
Graph theory has the potential to provide a better basis for determining 
the value of access to any particular set of network components.  The algo-
rithms discussed above provide the means for determining how much it 
costs to operate each network element, whether particular network elements 
are slack or saturated, and what impact granting access will have on the 
overall carrying capacity of the network. 
That said, those seeking to turn graph theory into a regulatory system 
must confront a number of complications that may cause rates determined 
on the basis of graph theory to systematically undercompensate network 
owners.  For example, determining the appropriate price becomes much 
more difficult once one takes into account that the volume of traffic typi-
cally varies over different portions of the day.  During quiet times, the de-
mands on the network are typically so low that no link is close to saturation, 
in which case the impact on the network owner would be negligible.  When 
that is the case, access prices would be extremely low.  The situation can be 
quite different during the peak times of the day, when granting access can 
saturate the overall carrying capacity of the network.  Network saturation 
would justify charging a higher price for access.  But at the same time, as 
queues begin to form behind the relevant bottlenecks, saturation also would 
degrade network performance. 
A network owner confronted with such a possibility might well choose 
to help bolster the reliability of its network by adding capacity.  Put another 
way, what appears at first blush to be excess capacity can more properly be 
regarded as a form of insurance that protects consumers against network 
 
50  47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B). 
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failure when short-run surges in demand cause the network to be saturated.  
On an ex ante basis, such excess capacity is serving a useful purpose even if 
it is not subsequently used.   
The analysis is complicated even further by the reality that, in most 
cases, the incurrence of fixed costs cannot be expanded incrementally.  In-
stead, fixed costs are often indivisible, in that they can only be added in 
large, discrete quantities.  In other words, because it is impossible to buy 
one-third of a switch, the network owner must either purchase an entire 
switch or no switch at all.51  As a result, network owners interested in main-
taining quality of service will necessarily add capacity before it is actually 
needed, which in turn will make it appear that networks never operate near 
full capacity.  A false impression—that excess capacity is endemic to com-
munications networks—would result.  This false impression may cause 
graph theoretical analyses to systematically understate the adverse eco-
nomic impact caused to the network owner by granting access.   
Such problems are not unique to graph theory.  Indeed, conventional 
ratemaking techniques are plagued with similar problems that typically re-
volve around whether a particular investment was either “prudent” when 
undertaken or is “used and useful” at the present time.52  As a result, the 
problems confronting graph theory are not different in kind from those fac-
ing more conventional approaches to ratesetting (although they may be dif-
ferent in degree).  Moreover, it is quite possible that graph theoretical 
models could be used to establish a baseline that could be adjusted to reflect 
these realities.  Although such an approach would lack the elegance and ac-
curacy of a formal solution, it may well provide a better foundation for 
policymaking if it offers a better second-best approximation of the efficient 
outcome than current ratemaking techniques. 
C. Limitations on Basing Prices on Market Benchmarks 
Other policymakers and scholars have proposed basing access rates on 
benchmark prices charged for comparable goods or on the final retail price 
of the network services.53  Economic theory, as well, generally favors using 
comparable sales as the best indicator of value.  The prices charged for 
similar goods and services provide observable evidence of the benefits to 
buyers and the costs to sellers.  In addition, unlike cost-based approaches, 
which focus solely on the supply side of the transaction, market-based ap-
proaches take into account what is perhaps the fundamental insight of neo-
 
51  See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 5, at 913. 
52  See William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the Python:  Is Lumpy Capacity Invest-
ment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383 (2002). 
53  See TELRIC NPRM, supra note 47, at 18,959 ¶ 34 (describing proposals to base access rates on 
retail prices through a methodology known as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (“ECPR”)); Local 
Competition Order, supra note 37, at 15,837–39 ¶¶ 660–662, 15,859 ¶ 709 (same); Spulber & Yoo, su-
pra note 5 (proposing such an approach for basing access prices on market benchmarks). 
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classical economics, which is that value is determined by an interaction of 
both supply and demand.54  Institutional considerations also appear to favor 
adoption of a market-based regime.  The decentralized decisionmaking in-
herent in markets is more likely to be able to incorporate the copious 
amounts of information needed to assess the value of particular network 
services than are regulatory authorities attempting to determine the correct 
measure of cost.55  This is particularly the case given that network owners 
are the primary source of information for regulatory decisionmaking, since 
owners have every incentive to be chary about disclosing information about 
their networks.  The advantages of decentralized decisionmaking also will 
be particularly pronounced in industries that are technologically dynamic.  
Although replacement cost tends to reflect market value over the long run, 
technological change and other exogenous shocks can causes prices to devi-
ate widely from efficient levels in the short run.56 
Even the seminal analyses that laid the foundation for the adoption of 
cost-based pricing explicitly recognized the preferability of taking a market-
based approach.  Despite this recognition that market-based benchmarks 
would better reflect economic value, the absence of external markets ren-
dered market-based pricing a practical impossibility.  This left regulators 
with little choice but to base their determination of a rate’s reasonableness 
on the costs of providing network service, with the primary debate center-
ing on whether such rates should be based on historical cost or replacement 
cost.57  Whatever the validity of this logic when first offered, it carries little 
weight in an era in which robust competition for telecommunications ser-
vices has emerged.  The emergence of alternative network technologies has 
now made market benchmarking quite feasible.  It has made it possible for 
policymakers to determine the value of network elements indirectly by us-
ing sales of comparable network services as market benchmarks.  Thus, 
those seminal analyses supporting cost-based pricing implicitly acknowl-
edged that the emergence of markets would cause the basic rationale sup-
porting cost-based pricing to collapse.58 
Consider the network element long regarded as the most likely subject 
of UNE access requests:  the telephone wires connecting individual house-
holds to the main switching facilities maintained by local telephone compa-
nies, otherwise known as “local loops.”  Because of the high sunk costs 
associated with wiring individual neighborhoods with telephone wires, the 
local loop has long been regarded as the portion of the network least likely 
 
54  See Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and Interagency Governance, 2003 MICH. ST. 
DCL L. REV. 701, 712. 
55  See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT 85–88 (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1989). 
56  See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 5, at 899. 
57  See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292–95 
(1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment) (offering a classic statement of this rationale). 
58  Indeed, the emergence of competitive alternatives undercuts the rationale for compelling access 
in the first place.  See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 5, at 973, 992, 1020. 
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to be duplicated.  Over the last few decades, however, wireless carriers have 
deployed spectrum-based voice networks that can perform the same func-
tions as the local loop.  Further, because wireless carriers often wish to 
place calls to wireline telephone customers or to customers of other wireless 
carriers, a market for services like those provided by the local loop has de-
veloped.  Although the terms of wireless-to-wireline interconnection are de-
termined by regulation,59 the terms of wireless-to-wireless interconnection 
are settled through arms-length transactions mediated by a market.60  In ad-
dition, competition among wireless providers has become quite robust, with 
eighty-three percent of the U.S. population being served by five or more 
wireless providers.61  As a result, the outcomes of arms-length negotiations 
between wireless providers could arguably be regarded as relatively close 
approximations of efficient pricing.62  Even if direct market benchmarks 
remain unavailable, methods exist for imputing prices for individual net-
work elements from the price charged in the retail market for network ser-
vices.63 
As a result, even critics of market-based approaches concede that so 
long as competition is sufficiently robust, market benchmarks would repre-
sent the best basis for setting access rates.64  The primary concern has been 
that the relevant markets that would be the source of such benchmarks are 
excessively concentrated.  Under standard monopoly or oligopoly theory, 
the absence of robust markets can lead the prices charged in those markets 
to be inefficiently high.65 
 
59  For example, the terms of wireless-to-wireline interconnection are governed by the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996.  See Local Competition Order, supra note 37, at 15,998–16,000 ¶¶ 1012–1013. 
60  See Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 
Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13,523, 13,534 ¶ 28 (2000) (declining to regulate the terms of 
wireless-to-wireless interconnection). 
61  See Eighth Report on CMRS Competition, supra note 2, at 14,876 ¶ 217 (citing this fact as sup-
port for the conclusion that the market for wireless telephony is effectively competitive).   
62  The process of converting comparable transactions into actual prices does pose a number of com-
plexities.  For example, comparable transactions typically need to be adjusted to reflect differences in 
actual services provided.  In addition, interconnection between wireless carriers is often accomplished 
indirectly through the incumbent LECs under terms dictated by state regulatory authorities.  See Local 
Competition Order, supra note 37, at 15,514 ¶¶ 26–27.  As such, wireless-to-wireless interconnection 
prices may not represent a truly independent point of reference. 
63  One such method is known as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (“ECPR”).  See generally J. 
GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL. F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 
283–392 (1997) (reviewing the history and criticisms of ECPR and offering a more refined, market-
based version called M-ECPR). 
64  See Candeub, supra note 15, at 430 (calling the market-benchmark approach to setting UNE 
prices, “if capable of implementation, perfectly correct” before criticizing the proposal as unimplement-
able). 
65  See id. at 431; TELRIC NPRM, supra note 47, at 18,959 ¶ 35 (rejecting ECPR because existing 
retail prices may reflect monopoly rents and thus may cause access prices based on ECPR to be too 
high); Local Competition Order, supra note 37, at 15,859 ¶ 709 (same). 
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Graph theory suggests that this view of market-based pricing is too 
simplistic.  Specifically, it suggests market-based pricing may yield access 
prices that are either too high or too low.  The variability in the value of 
seemingly equivalent network components stems from the fact that the 
value of a network component varies with the particular network in which it 
is situated.  In other words, an element in one network might have a very 
different value than the corresponding element in another network.  Unlike 
the result suggested by conventional economic theory, which presumes that 
prices charged in concentrated markets will be too high, graph theory sug-
gests that there may be no consistent bias in the direction of this effect.  
Thus, a graph theoretical approach surpasses present network theory by 
suggesting that regulators need to consider additional factors beyond market 
concentration in determining access pricing and access rules.  Regulators 
should consider the effects of access regulations on network capacity and 
on the evolution of networks.   
D. Compelled Access to Broadband Networks 
Another striking development of recent years has been the displace-
ment of narrowband services, in which users connect to the Internet through 
dial-up modems connected to conventional telephone lines, by broadband 
technologies, such as cable modem systems and digital subscriber lines 
(“DSL”).  One notable difference between narrowband and broadband tech-
nologies is the role played by Internet service providers (“ISPs”).  In the 
narrowband world, end users could use their telephone lines to contact their 
choice of any number of ISPs, such as America Online, MSN, Earthlink, 
Juno, or Netzero.  In the broadband world, it is not unusual for cable mo-
dem or DSL providers to require their customers to use a designated, pro-
prietary ISP.   
The growth in the use of proprietary ISPs by broadband providers has 
prompted calls for the FCC to prohibit such exclusivity arrangements and to 
require that last-mile providers make their networks accessible to all unaf-
filiated ISPs on a nondiscriminatory basis.66  This has emerged as a major 
issue in a number of recent mergers.67  The FCC has sought comment on 
whether it should require cable modem and DSL providers to make their fa-
cilities available to unaffiliated ISPs on a nondiscriminatory basis,68 a policy 
 
66  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Architec-
ture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001). 
67  See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition?:  A 
Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 39 (2004) (reviewing the 
fate of multiple ISP access proposals during AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne, America 
Online’s acquisition of Time Warner, and Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable holdings).  
68  See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, De-
claratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4839–41 ¶¶ 72–74, 4843–47 
¶¶ 80–93 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM]; Appropriate Framework 
for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 
99:1687  (2005) On the Regulation of Networks as Complex Systems 
 1717
issue initially called “open access” and to which the FCC now refers as 
“multiple ISP access.”69 
To date, the debate has focused on the impact that mandating multiple 
ISP access would have on the levels of overall investment in new network 
technologies and on whether failing to mandate multiple ISP access would 
harm the markets for broadband content and applications.70  What has been 
largely overlooked is how the interrelationships among individual compo-
nents can cause multiple ISP access to have a complex and unpredictable 
impact on the overall network capacity and performance.  To cite but one 
example, as noted earlier,71 decisions about whether to use higher volume 
trunk-line technologies depend upon the ability to consolidate traffic.  Only 
if the volume being carried is sufficiently large does the per-unit savings 
justify the incurrence of the higher fixed costs needed to deploy the trunk-
line technology.  Imposing multiple ISP access would have the effect of al-
lowing an unaffiliated ISP to siphon off a portion of the traffic that would 
otherwise have flowed through the incumbent’s network.  The resulting re-
duction in traffic runs the risk of dramatically changing what would other-
wise be the preferred network configuration.  High volume technologies 
that would otherwise be cost-reducing become economically nonviable.   
This effect is likely to be further exacerbated by the fact that once net-
works have been deployed, their configurations cannot easily be changed.  
As a result, broadband owners who deploy networks before multiple ISP 
access has been mandated might be left with an architecture they never 
would have created in the first place had they known that access would be 
mandated.  This inevitably results in increasing the costs of providing net-
work service.  Higher costs, in turn, reduce the economic viability of vari-
ous business models for Internet-based enterprises. 
Graph theory’s ability to reflect the interaction among cost, capacity, 
and reliability provides insights into the potential problems of multiple-ISP 
access that far exceed those provided by the current approaches to regulat-
ing communications network.  It is this ability to capture the manner in 
which individual network elements interact with one another when placed 
                                                                                                                           
3019, 3042–43 ¶¶ 50–52 (2002); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,287, 19,298–306 ¶¶ 25–49 (2000); see also Yoo, su-
pra note 67, at 40 (reviewing comments submitted during these proceedings asking the FCC to impose 
multiple ISP access). 
69  See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 68, at 4839 ¶ 72. 
70  Our view is that the current debate has overstated the concerns underlying calls for multiple ISP 
access.  The tendency for broadband providers to mandate the use of a proprietary ISP is more likely a 
reflection of the potential efficiencies inherent in the architecture of broadband technologies than of 
anticompetitive motives.  See Yoo, supra note 67, at 33–34.  Moreover, the overall structure of the mar-
ket makes it implausible that any broadband provider would be able to adversely affect markets for 
broadband content and applications.  See id. at 50–53.  In addition, compelled access weakens invest-
ment incentives that are critical when emerging technologies are involved.  See id. at 65; Spulber & 
Yoo, supra note 5, at 1020. 
71  See supra Part III.C. 
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within the context of an integrated system that remains one of the key as-
pects of network behavior. 
E. The Regulation of Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) 
Internet telephony, sometimes called voice over Internet protocol 
(“VoIP”),72 provides yet another illustration of graph theory’s analytic po-
tential.  VoIP has been heralded as a transformative technological develop-
ment.  By offering the promise of turning every broadband platform into a 
potential provider of local telephone service, VoIP has the potential to in-
crease the level of rivalry in an industry segment that has proven the most 
impervious to competition.   
The advent of VoIP has inevitably raised questions about how it should 
be regulated.  Although the FCC has issued a handful of early decisions in 
this area,73 most of the key issues remain unresolved.74  The area in which 
the FCC has offered a significant degree of guidance is with respect to the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), which 
requires all telecommunications carriers75 to design equipment, facilities, 
and services in such a way that allows properly authorized law enforcement 
agencies to conduct wiretaps.76   
 
72  Because this category of services encompasses services provided entirely over private data net-
works as well as over the public Internet, the FCC prefers the terms “voice over Internet protocol” or “IP 
telephony” to the term “Internet telephony.”  See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report 
to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, 11,541 n.173 (1998) [hereinafter Stevens Report]. 
73  See Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T’s Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services Are Ex-
empt from Access Charges, Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457 (2004) (ruling that telephone calls initiated from a 
traditional handset using the standard telephone numbering system remains subject to traditional tele-
phone regulation notwithstanding the fact that the long distance carrier converts the call into and trans-
mits the call using an IP format); Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com’s Free World Dialup Is 
Neither Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 
F.C.C.R. 3307 (2004) (ruling that services that simply facilitate peer-to-peer communication fall outside 
the scope of traditional telephone regulation); Stevens Report, supra note 72, at 11,541–45 ¶¶ 83–93 
(distinguishing between “phone-to-phone” IP telephony, which remains subject to traditional telephone 
regulation, and “computer-to-computer” IP telephony, which constitutes an information service that is 
largely unregulated). 
74  The FCC recently began the process of determining how VoIP should be regulated by requesting 
comment on a wide range of VoIP-related issues.  See IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004). 
75  “Telecommunications carrier” is a defined term under CALEA that differs from the definition es-
tablished by the Communications Act of 1934.  See 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(A)–(C) (2004).   
76  Id. § 1002(a).  Consistent with its initial VoIP precedents, the FCC distinguished between “man-
aged” VoIP services (in which the VoIP provider acts as an active mediator between end users by per-
forming such critical functions as call set-up, switching, addressing, or routing) and “nonmanaged” 
VoIP services (in which the VoIP provider plays little or no role in routing and transmitting packets be-
tween end users and instead serves primarily as a centralized directory that helps users establish peer-to-
peer communications).  The FCC tentatively concluded that because managed VoIP services serve as “a 
replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange service,” id. § 1001(8)(B)(ii), they 
are subject to CALEA.  At the same time, the FCC tentatively concluded that nonmanaged VoIP ser-
vices fall outside the scope of CALEA, either because they are similar to private networks, in that they 
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Graph theory provides several basic intuitions about the likely impact 
of applying CALEA to VoIP.  Currently, the packets associated with VoIP 
traffic are indistinguishable from the packets associated with other applica-
tions and can travel by any of the available routes through the Internet.  
Subjecting VoIP to CALEA would force all Internet-based voice traffic to 
pass through a discrete number of gateways.  The creation of such bottle-
necks will have the inevitable effect of reducing the overall capacity of the 
network, since mandating that all VoIP traffic traverse designated gateways 
would preclude the network from employing a large percentage of the fea-
sible paths available to interconnect two nodes.  Graph theory also reveals 
that applying CALEA to VoIP would likely degrade the quality of VoIP 
service, since forcing traffic to pass through a limited number of discrete 
checkpoints would tend to create queues that would limit the ability of such 
networks to guarantee particular throughput rates.  The resulting delays 
would weigh particularly heavily on voice communications, in which de-
lays of as little as a quarter-second have been deemed unacceptable.  
CALEA requirements would also reduce the viability and profitability of 
VoIP services.  In turn, this would frustrate the emergence of competition in 
local telephone service, which remains one of the central goals of modern 
telecommunications policy.77 
F. A Formal Methodology for Calculating Regulatory Rates 
Finally, graph theory offers the promise of providing a basis for calcu-
lating the economic impact of particular regulatory interventions.  Although 
the problems posed by graph theory can be quite complex, algorithms and 
modern improvements in computer processing have rendered these prob-
lems more tractable.  Simply applying a graph theoretical framework yields 
basic intuitions that offer a valuable contribution, even if the precise magni-
tude of that effect is never quantifiable, as demonstrated by the other policy 
examples discussed above.  Understanding the nature of networks as com-
plex systems is highly valuable in avoiding policy mistakes that stem from 
the representation of networks as collections of unconnected elements.  At a 
                                                                                                                           
are confined to a limited universe of users, or because they constitute “information services.”  Either de-
termination would be sufficient to take nonmanaged VoIP services outside the scope of CALEA.  See 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, 19 F.C.C.R. 15,676, 15,693–95 ¶ 37, 15,708–10 ¶¶ 56–
58 (2004) (explaining the distinction between managed and nonmanaged VoIP services). 
77  The FCC’s tentative decision to distinguish between managed and nonmanaged VoIP services 
would have similar, albeit less sweeping, effects.  The graph theoretical analysis that we propose sug-
gests that by subjecting VoIP systems in which traffic flows in a more distributed manner to a lower de-
gree of regulation than VoIP services that route traffic through centralized gateways, implementing 
CALEA in this manner would induce a regulatory bias toward nonmanaged systems that might have ef-
fects on network performance and capacity that go far beyond what conventional analyses might lead 
one to anticipate.  Indeed, the CALEA-related requirements could interact with the configuration of par-
ticular networks or other aspects of the regulatory regime in a way that has effects that can be as dra-
matic as they are unpredictable.   
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minimum, the study of the behavior of complex systems suggests the need 
for regulatory forbearance and greater reliance on market solutions in net-
work industries. 
We acknowledge that a large number of practical obstacles remain be-
fore graph theory can become the basis for a regulatory regime.  As an ini-
tial matter, the precise impact of any regulatory intervention would vary 
heavily depending on the particular network involved and the amount of 
capacity accessed.  Indeed, each network and each access request would 
likely yield a different answer.  Furthermore, the problems caused by the 
indivisibility of fixed costs and by variability in demand may make excess 
capacity appear endemic to network industries, which in turn may cause the 
prices calculated in accordance with graph theory to systematically underes-
timate the economic impact of granting access.78 
In addition, regulatory authorities attempting to implement a graph 
theoretical pricing regime may depend on the network owner to provide in-
formation about the network.  Disclosure of information about network ar-
chitecture creates administrative costs for network operators and runs the 
risk of giving away competitive advantages.  Access regulation also in-
creases the likelihood that incumbent firms will be hurt by the strategic be-
havior of competitors.79 
That said, these obstacles can prove surmountable.  Indeed, the same 
problems long have confronted—and have been overcome by—regulatory 
authorities charged with establishing rates for telecommunications services.  
“Cost proxy models” are one example of a recent development in conven-
tional ratemaking approaches that demonstrates how graph theoretical mod-
els may not be as analytically and informationally intractable as they may 
first appear.80  These models, which have been used in a number of recent 
federal and state rate proceedings, avoid relying on network owners for in-
formation about how their networks are configured.  Instead, cost proxy 
models base their calculations on computer simulations of how best to de-
ploy a network given the particular technological processes employed.  The 
more sophisticated versions of these models contain built-in optimizing rou-
tines that effectively rebuild the network from scratch each time in order to 
 
78  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
79  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
80  For the seminal work on cost proxy models, see D. GABEL & M. KENNET, ESTIMATING THE COST 
STRUCTURE OF THE LOCAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGE NETWORK (Nat’l Reg. Res. Inst., Working Paper 
No. 91-16, 1991); BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, INCREMENTAL COSTS OF TELEPHONE ACCESS AND LOCAL 
USE (Rand Corp., Working Paper No. R-3909, 1990).  For an overview, see Sharkey, supra note 9, at 
204–20.  For more recent elaborations, see FARID GASMI ET AL., COST PROXY MODELS AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY (2002); DAVID M. MANDY AND WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, DYNAMIC 
PRICING AND INVESTMENT FROM STATIC PROXY MODELS (FCC Off. of Strategic Plan. & Pol’y Analy-
sis, Working Paper No. 40, Sept. 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-238934A2.pdf. 
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determine its best configuration.81  Once the optimal configuration has been 
determined, the costs provided by each element can be determined through 
an analysis of the applicable engineering processes.  Using cost proxies in 
this manner obviates the need to rely on the network owner to provide all of 
the relevant cost data.  For regulatory purposes, networks should not be 
compared to a hypothetical most-efficient network, but models of the net-
work can be adjusted to reflect properties of the regulated firm’s existing 
network. 
In short, the increasingly widespread use of cost proxy models in more 
conventional ratemaking proceedings suggests that graph theoretical prob-
lems, while complex, can form a workable basis for network policy.  Al-
though the informational requirements needed to perform a graph 
theoretical are quite onerous, they are no more demanding than the informa-
tion required to determine firm-specific tariffs under cost proxy models.  
The shift to a graph theoretical approach would simply change the optimi-
zation routines embedded in the relevant computer programs.  The ultimate 
result may employ different algorithms and may require more iterations, but 
the problem would not seem to be any less tractable. 
Thus, there is reason to think that graph theory could be directly opera-
tionalized into a fully working regulatory methodology that makes it possi-
ble to calculate access prices in a way that reflects the complexity of 
interactions between network components.  Although the difficulties in im-
plementing the graph-theoretical regulatory regimes discussed above may 
ultimately cause the calculation to fall short of a true, first-best outcome, it 
is quite possible that graph theory may provide a better second-best ap-
proximation than that provided by conventional approaches.  If such a re-
gime proves unworkable, the complexity of the interactions captured by our 
analysis counsels strongly in favor of regulatory forebearance.  The indi-
vidualized decisionmaking inherent in private ordering is better suited to 
implementing the context-specific approach required by graph theory than 
is the centralized decisionmaking process inherent in regulation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The conceptual approach set forth in this Essay has the potential to 
revolutionize the way policymakers and academics conceptualize network 
policy by providing a basis for describing and analyzing network architec-
 
81  The reality that communications networks often require sunk costs in particular locations may re-
quire some feasibility limitations on some of the possible hypothetical networks.  TELRIC takes such 
considerations into account by basing rates on “the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing 
location of the incumbent LEC's wire centers.”  47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (2004) (emphasis added).  For 
purposes of cost recovery and some types of access regulation, however, it may be necessary to examine 
the existing configuration of loops and switches beyond the wire centers, as pointed out in J. Gregory 
Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1068, 1141 (1997).  Graph theory can help regulators analyze the effects on costs of changes in 
network architecture. 
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ture that captures the extent to which networks are more than just the sum 
of their component parts.  It reveals how the relationship between different 
network elements causes them to interact with one another in ways that are 
often surprising and unpredictable.  It also reveals that the current regula-
tory approach, which treats each network element as if it existed in a vac-
uum, fails to provide an accurate reflection of the impact that regulation has 
on the network as a whole.  Most importantly, it demonstrates how access 
requirements can interfere with network owners’ ability to design optimal 
network architectures.  Although the application of graph theory to specific 
problems is not without its difficulties, we believe that the approach we 
propose provides sufficient insights and intuitions into network behavior to 
justify employing it as a tool of policy analysis.  Our analysis demonstrates 
the importance of shifting to an analytical framework that can capture the 
complex interrelationships among the elements of networks. Understanding 
networks as complex systems should provide policymakers with a clearer 
picture of the effects of network architecture on usage patterns. This is use-
ful for examining the effects of regulation on the evolution of networks. 
 
